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Abstract: This paper identifies an aesthetics implicit in Spinoza’s philosophy
through the concept of a genesis of the aesthetic. A genesis of the aesthetic indi-
cates that a philosophy of art is not yet fully formed in his work, but can emerge
as a consequence or effect of his thought. This aesthetic theory would evaluate
the work of art primarily in its relationship to truth. Following the architecton-
ics of Spinoza’s own thought, this paper constructs a progression – moving from
the imagination, to reason, to intuition – toward a concept of aesthetic practices
that aligns itself ever more closely with the freedom, perfection, and affirmation of
infinite substance itself. The specific forms of aesthetic reception and production
flowing from Spinoza’s ideal of wisdom unite two seemingly disparate paradigms:
the aesthetic as essentially affirmative, as a joy in the individual power of every
individuated thing, on the one hand; and the cultivation of a critical, ethically
informed aesthetics of liberation, one capable of occupying different positions (obe-
dience, autonomy, resistance) with respect to state or sovereign power, on the other
hand.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE GENESIS OF THE AESTHETIC
After years of assuming that Spinoza has nothing, or very little, to add to
the study of aesthetics, philosophers and intellectual historians are now turn-
ing to Spinoza’s aesthetics with renewed vigour.1 If there is an innovative
aesthetics to be found in Spinoza, one of its most significant features would
consist in a refusal to think the aesthetic as a triangulation of the beauti-
ful, the good, and the true, as was the case when the concept of aesthetics
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emerged in the eighteenth century, the blueprint for which is to be found
in Alexander Baumgarten’s Aesthetica (1750-58). An aesthetic theory de-
rived from Spinoza’s thought would evaluate the work of art primarily in its
relationship to truth; it would thus demand the construction of a veridical
aesthetics rather than an axiological one, a philosophy of art no longer or-
ganised around beauty, a substantive notion of the good, and the pursuit of
sensuous pleasure. Truth, in turn, would refer to Spinoza’s concept of meta-
physical truth, along with its ethical and political implications, some key
doctrines of which can be cursorily and simplistically described as follows:
there is only one substance, God or nature; finite things are modes of this
infinite substance and individual entities have no independent existence out-
side God or nature; knowledge is to be evaluated according to adequation,
where adequation is judged according to the intellection of how all things
express the causally determined order of infinite substance; imagination, or
how human beings typically know the world through their senses, produces
inadequate knowledge, whereas reason, which is generated by following de-
ductions from definitions and axioms, produces adequate knowledge; as all
individuated entities are expressions of substance, they strive ‘to persevere’ in
their being (the definition of the conatus in E3P6), the ideal of which consists
in an increase of the individual’s power of action; infinite substance alone has
the highest perfection and degree of reality, as it is determining but itself un-
determined, always active and generative, wholly necessary but at the same
time wholly free; the human being is thus more perfect the more it intellectu-
ally cognises the activity, autonomy, and necessity characteristic of substance
itself.2 Ultimately Spinoza supplants the dyad good/evil as a primary nor-
mative interface with the world with that of joy/sadness, where joy signals
an increase (E4Appen XXX) and sadness a decrease in power (E3P11S).
Given this epistemology and metaphysics, the aesthetic, here broadly con-
strued as a discursive space for theoretically informed reflection referring to
or derivative of artistic practices, seems to belong more to the world of finite
individuals rather than to that of infinite substance, to the imagination rather
than reason, to inadequate rather than adequate ideas. Such a conception of
the aesthetic would be regressive for those invested in the truth-generating
potential of art. The hostility towards art is all too familiar in the history of
philosophy: does not Plato claim the eternal truth of ideas only to ascribe to
the work of art a second-order mimetic status – an imitation of an imitation –
and hence, marginalise art as epistemically flawed and politically dangerous?
And would not Spinoza associate aesthetic objects primarily with the imag-
ination – an inadequate form of knowledge in which ‘singular things. . . have
been represented to us through the senses in a way that is mutilated, con-
fused, and without order,’ or a form of knowledge mediated through equivocal
‘signs’ (E2P40S2)?
In the Ethics, Spinoza defines the imagination as a kind of knowledge (the
lowest kind) that emerges when the mind looks at bodies as images, as ‘af-
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fections of the human Body whose ideas represent external bodies as present
to us’ (E2P17S). The imagination describes the default quotidian form of
perception and knowledge acquisition for human beings; when individuals
perceive the world as populated by objects external to them that affect their
bodies in different ways, they are relying on the imagination as the primary
source for their understanding of the world. Inasmuch as aesthetic practices
generally invoke this everyday manner of orienting oneself in the world, they
belong primarily to the imagination. The aesthetic would thereby seem ex-
cluded from the purview of rational ‘common notions and adequate ideas of
the properties of things’ (E2P40S2). At best, the work of art would have a
heuristic value for Spinoza: a source of imaginative knowledge that could be
propitious given the affective constitution of the finite human being and its
manner of striving to persevere in its being (conatus), ultimately deficient in
its manner of expressing truth.
While the idea of a heuristic value of the aesthetic represents one way
Spinoza himself approaches artistic practices and products, it does not ex-
haust the implications for rethinking the aesthetic that result from specula-
tive engagement with Spinoza’s works. Spinoza’s own work provides clues
as to how an alternative veridical aesthetics could be conceptualised. In the
Ethics, Spinoza distinguishes two further kinds of knowledge after the first
type of knowledge (imagination): reason and intuition (scientia intuitiva).3
Each kind of knowledge can be correlated with its own attendant concept of
aesthetic activity. Following the architectonics of Spinoza’s own thought, I
will construct a progression (with some digressions)—moving from the imag-
ination, to reason, to intuition—toward a concept of aesthetic practices that
aligns itself ever more closely with the freedom, perfection, and affirmation
of infinite substance itself.
This progression is organised around the figure of a genesis of the aes-
thetic. A genesis of the aesthetic of the sort that Spinoza stimulates entails
two forms of interrogation in the face of aesthetic practices: what are the
material (physical, cultural, semiotic, technological) conditions of the emer-
gence of the aesthetic, or in what way is the aesthetic part of the necessary
order of individuated beings? And what does the aesthetic in turn produce
or generate, how does it manifest nature as an expansive, flourishing pro-
liferation of entities? These two forms of genesis respectively approach the
agency of the aesthetic from a double perspective: insofar as the aesthetic
refers to finite entities (natura naturata) with their own specific histories and
conditions; and insofar as aesthetic practices and objects disclose metaphys-
ical truth, nature as infinite, active substance, as natura naturans. Finally,
the idea of a genesis of the aesthetic indicates and hopefully mitigates the
anachronism of attributing aesthetic thought to Spinoza: the aesthetic is not
yet fully formed as a discourse in his work, but can emerge as a consequence
or effect of his thought.
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II. SPINOZA’S FEINT AND THE VIGILANCE OF THE
AESTHETIC
Spinoza’s texts ultimately intend to produce a transformative effect on their
readership, to induct readers into a form of intellection that will change how
reality appears to them. In the Ethics, Spinoza refers to this form of intellec-
tion as the third kind of knowledge, intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitiva),
which entails a paradigmatic shift in one’s manner of viewing things. With
the attainment of this form of knowledge, individual things appear ‘under the
species of eternity’ (sub specie aeternitatis), namely, ‘insofar as we conceive
them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine
nature’ (E5P29S). The production of this way of looking at the world results
in an intellectual love of God as perpetually generative nature, hence in sheer
affirmation without resentment or guilt, in activity rather than passivity, and
in the recognition that the activity of one’s own mind is nothing other than
an expression of the ‘infinite love by which God loves himself’ (E5P36).
The first intellectual operation stimulated by intuitive knowledge consists
in a dissolution of the aesthetic field and a denial of the reality of imaginative
forms; intuition loosens human beings from their dependence on anthropocen-
tric fictions, ideologically encoded narratives, and the authority of dogmatic
religions and mythologies operating through signs. Whereas imaginative fic-
tions of this sort make the human being into something passive, intuitive
knowledge seeks to disentangle human beings from the pull of these imagina-
tions and thereby activate the mind. When human beings look at the world
under the aspect of eternity, ‘what we have shown to perish is the imagination,
through which alone we are said to be acted upon’ (E5P40C). What follows
is a dramatic defamiliarisation and delegitimisation of socially encrusted nor-
mative distinctions (good/bad, beautiful/ugly) pervading signifying forms.
If the imagination perishes, so too does its aura, the means whereby it se-
cures assent from those subjected to it. Spinoza’s ontology thereby becomes
a source for aesthetic ideological critique operating in tandem with the bliss
and joy of intellectual affirmation, with an increased power of action.
Spinoza nevertheless draws upon forms of signification otherwise associ-
ated with the imagination in the attainment of his intellectual goals; at key
moments in the Ethics, for example, Spinoza invokes processes of sensibility,
fictions, hypotheticals, and heuristics as an indispensable part of the gene-
sis of the ideal form of knowledge, of reality as it appears under the aspect
of eternity. Such is the case in the following passage, which can be found
towards the end of the Ethics:
But here it should be noted that although we are already cer-
tain that the Mind is eternal, insofar as it conceives things under
a species of eternity, nevertheless, for an easier explanation and
better understanding of the things we wish to show, we shall con-
sider it as if it were now beginning to be, and were now beginning
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to understand things under a species of eternity, as we have done
up to this point. We may do this without danger of error, pro-
vided we are careful to draw our conclusions only from evident
premises. (E5P31S)
Spinoza invokes the hypothetical as a heuristic: he represents the eternity of
the mind as if it had a genesis, as if knowledge itself were coming to be and the
human being would be transformed in the light of this knowledge. In a later
passage of the Ethics, Spinoza designates the precise epistemic and rhetor-
ical strategy in the above scholium as an authorial feint: ‘we have feigned’
(finximus) is the term used by Spinoza to describe this thought experiment
in which eternity emerges from duration.4 Spinoza thereby hints at a form of
feigning (invention, fictionality) that is commensurate with the emergence of
epistemic insight.
While drawing attention to the fact that imaginative forms – words, nar-
ratives, fictions – can, and most often do, lead to error, he thus allows for the
possibility that they will not always do so. The proper attitude with which
Spinoza approaches the imagination is one of vigilance. In the Treatise on the
Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza writes:
since words are part of the imagination, i.e., since we feign many
concepts, in accordance with the random composition of words
in the memory from some disposition of the body, it is not to be
doubted that words, as much as the imagination, can be the cause
of many and great errors, unless we are very wary of them.5
In the final qualifying clause of the above passage, Spinoza suggests that a
form of vigilance – being ‘wary’ of words and the products of the imagination
– can prohibit a fall into error. Spinoza adopts this same attitude of vigilance
in the feint (discussed above in the analysis of E5P31S) designed to bring
readers into a view of the world under the species of eternity, that is, to elicit
a genesis of intellection.
In Spinoza’s feint – which mediates between duration and eternity, and
hence imagination and intellect – one can isolate two different epistemic
stances to the imagination: one that remains caught in mere imagination,
in illusion, in fiction, in signs; and another that has progressed into rational-
ity and regards the imagination with a different sense of its value and power
in the order of nature. Spinoza’s most urgent initial task consists in detach-
ing his readership from the immediate hold of the imagination, in alienating
readers from everyday practices of intelligibility and stimulating processes of
defamiliarisation. After this initial defamiliarisation, following the extraction
of the human being from the immediate pull of the imagination, the imagina-
tion can then be repurposed. And it is in this repurposing of the imagination,
in a manner informed by reason, that Spinoza gestures toward the possible
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utility of aesthetic practices for the figure of the wise person, the particular
shape of the life that the Ethics posits as maximally informed by adequate
ideas.
Before this activating power of the aesthetic becomes possible, Spinoza de-
mands an anaesthetising function as an essential part of looking at the world
through the intellect: ontological value must be extracted from its relation
to human sensation. Any aesthetic affirmation requires first an anaesthetics;
Spinoza writes: ‘things are not more or less perfect because they please or
offend men’s senses, or because they are of use to, or are incompatible with,
human nature’ (E1App). While Spinoza cultivates what many would call a
posthuman perspective by advocating for a non-anthropocentric manner of
grasping the multiplicity of beings, he nevertheless attends to the specificity
of the human being, its particular manner of persevering in its being (its
conatus). And it is here that the aesthetic – both in the sense of an affirma-
tion of sensuous knowledge as well as the affirmative role of an imaginative
ideal – is to be found, namely by attending to the needs of the human being
as a particular being:
It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh and restore himself
in moderation with pleasant food and drink, with scents, with the
beauty of green plants, with decoration, music, sports, the theater,
and other things of this kind, which anyone can use without injury
to another. For the human Body is composed of a great many
parts of different natures, which constantly require new and varied
nourishment, so that the whole Body may be equally capable of all
the things which can follow from its nature, and hence, so that the
Mind also may be equally capable of understanding many things.
(E4P45S)
Spinoza naturalises aesthetic-imaginative practices by drawing attention to a
feedback loop between physiological processes and artefacts focalising sensu-
ous pleasure: the body’s multiple parts (organs) require exercise in order to
prevent atrophy and stimulate growth; to exercise the body is to exercise the
mind, since body and mind are parallel attributes of substance (E2P7); from
which it follows that aesthetic practices can increase degrees of intellection
and produce a heightened power of action.6 Spinoza in this instance makes his
absolute ontology of substance compatible with a focalising form of anthro-
pocentrism, or the affirmation of what is proper to the human being qua in-
dividual composed of multiple other individual parts. The aesthetic is proper
to the human, just as the anaesthetic (abstracting ontological value from con-
texts of human sensibility) is proper to the truth of substance. Spinoza makes
these two seemingly incompatible ideas compatible, uniting a non-humanistic
(non-anthropocentric) monist ontology with the humanism of an embodied
aesthetics.7
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The idea of a physiological aesthetics in relation to the exercise of sensibil-
ity – aesthetics as the stimulation of the human organism in such a way that
increases its power of intellection – finds its analog in a political aesthetics in
relation to historical narrative forms. Just as the aesthetic exercise of pleasure
is physiologically useful for the body and thus for the mind, so is the practice
of narrative in the form of histories (historiae) useful for the health of civic
bodies and collective forms. According to Susan James, Spinoza views narra-
tive as a ‘means to freedom’ since ‘the way of life endorsed by reason needs to
be brought within imaginative reach if it is to model our desires and actions’.8
Spinoza writes the following about historical narratives – which belong to
imaginative forms of signification – in the Theological-Political Treatise:
. . . though faith in historical narratives cannot give us the knowl-
edge and love of God, we do not deny that reading them is very
useful in relation to civil life. For the more we have observed and
the better we know the customs and character of men – which
can best be known from their actions – the more cautiously we
will be able to live among them and the better we will be able to
accommodate our actions and lives to their mentality, as much as
reason allows.
Histories cannot produce ‘knowledge and love of God’; only philosophy and
science can produce knowledge of this sort. However, historical narratives do
produce a particular knowledge of human beings and collectives (‘the customs
and character of men’). One who already has knowledge of nature can more
adequately grasp the power of these histories, namely, as sources of anthropo-
logical information capable of enabling a fit between a cultural and political
regime and the disposition of the philosopher. The philosopher – one who
loves God and knows nature – can thus elevate histories from mere works of
the imagination to sources of more adequate knowledge by granting them an
epistemic, political, and ethical value, by drawing upon them to increase an
individual’s or a collective’s power of action.
III. A NON-IMAGINATIVE AESTHETICS
Thus far, the aesthetic has played the role of a liminal or mediating form:
for example, in Spinoza’s thought experiments that temporarily make the
operations of the intellect into a genetic, and hence imaginative process (his
heuristics, or aids to the understanding); in artistic practices more narrowly
conceived, as a power of action specific to the individuality of the human as a
sensuous being albeit grounded in an ontology that refuses to privilege human
sensation; and in textual products functioning as points of contact between
the wisdom of the philosopher and lived cultural and political practices.
The preceding instances of aesthetic possibility are intertwined with the
imagination, and more specifically, with the integration of the imagination
into physiologically and politically expansive ways of being. But can there
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be an aesthetics of the pure intellect, a non-imaginative aesthetics? If so,
it would be an aesthetics of the pure intellectual joy, a power of action ab-
stracted from sensation. Domenica Romagni writes of the possibility of this
form of aesthetics, one in which the ‘contemplation and understanding of
God generates a special kind of satisfaction that is distinguished from mere
sensory pleasure’.9 The satisfaction accompanying the contemplation of God
would also be present in the contemplation of all individual entities in the
world insofar as they are in God, or insofar as the intellect can trace those
entities back to the necessity of substance. The aesthetic here indicates an
aesthetic stance more than an aesthetics properly conceived; it is thus de-
tached from the narrower contexts of significance generally associated with
aesthetic practices, for example, works of art. This view of aesthetic activity
has the peculiarity (perhaps the advantage) of not making the criteria for the
aesthetic depend on a type of object – whether music, painting, perfume, the
beauty of plants, theater, or other objects of ‘taste’ – but on an intellection
of the object. This ideal is not foreign to aesthetic practices even more nar-
rowly conceived; John Cage’s work, for example, shows how silence or noise
can become music when listened to as music. Looking at the aesthetic in this
way opens the possibility of a radical aestheticism in Spinoza’s thought, one
in which all things can become a source of intellectual joy.
Precisely such a possibility makes this account of Spinoza’s aesthetics si-
multaneously traditional – linking up with the nexus established between
contemplation and satisfaction traceable back to Aristotle and Augustine –
and modern, inasmuch as the pleasure associated with contemplation would
be nominalistic, no longer dependent on the Good or the True or the Beautiful,
but a way of viewing distinct and concrete individuals: Baudelaire’s rotting
corpse, Duchamps’ ready-mades, indeed, any individual whatever. The impli-
cation of such an aesthetics lies in the radicality of its power of affirmation.
This aesthetic stance would necessarily deny the reality of the grotesque,
as it would fold the affective-impulsive reaction to grotesque things into a
higher-order intellectual affirmation. It would also expand the purview of
the aesthetic to all individual things capable of being contemplated. Those
wishing to limit the scope of the aesthetic to specific cultural techniques and
practices would object to this expansive operation, which would make the
aesthetic as infinite as substance itself.
This conception of the aesthetic would become operative in Spinoza’s third
kind of knowledge, the ideal of intuition (scientia intuitiva), or knowledge of
individuals inasmuch they follow from the nature of God. Thus far, then, any
speculative aesthetics traceable back to Spinoza would seem to lie either in
an enhanced awareness of the power of the imagination (Spinoza’s first kind
of knowledge) or in the joy accompanying intuition (Spinoza’s third kind of
knowledge). Is there, however, a possible aesthetics of reason itself, of the
second kind of knowledge as exemplified by the geometrical style of Spinoza’s
Ethics, which results from ‘common notions’ (E2P40S2) and thus belongs
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decisively to the domain of philosophy? While the definition and function
of ‘common notions’ are disputed among scholars of Spinoza – they refer
variously to innate ideas that are always true (i.e. axiomatic and a priori
geometrical knowledge), general physical properties (motion and rest), and
properties shared by individual things10 – there is nevertheless a manner in
which common notions form a condition for textual practices and reading
technologies, indeed, a decisive condition for the very form through which
reason enters into concrete – finite and durational – practices.
First, the sign itself – not in terms of what it means or how it is interpreted,
but its basal materiality, the fact that there is something like an immanent
semiotic structure of the real to be decoded and traced – arguably belongs
to the form of knowledge produced by common notions. This ontology or
materiality of the sign (sign qua common notion) is to be differentiated from
its interpretation (sign qua imagination). According to Lorenzo Vinciguerra,
the concept of the trace, the vestigium, lies at the foundation of a semiotic
habitus that pervades Spinoza’s thought: ‘vestigium is built out of the com-
mon notions that are used to characterise extension (motus, individuum), in
such a way that the vestigia can be considered a secondary common notion.’11
While the interpretation of the sign belongs to the imagination, the sign as
general ontological condition of knowledge belongs to reason.
If all is potentially sign for Spinoza, a problem nevertheless emerges con-
cerning the specific form of knowledge, how knowledge can be represented in
such a way that it is not subsumed under mere interpretation, mere significa-
tion. The form of Spinoza’s Ethics presents readers with this precise problem
of representation, as the communication of reason – via the geometric style
of the Ethics itself – cannot, according to its own assignation of the sign to
imagination, take place in a semiotically encoded medium. One solution is
to differentiate concepts of encoding according to their degrees of epistemo-
logical adequation; Deleuze, in his interpretation of Spinoza, distinguishes
essentially between a sign and an expression, where a sign is inadequate and
‘grounds our obedience’ and an expression ‘expresses an essence. . . makes it
known to us’.12 According to this distinction, the Ethics does not signify, but
expresses.
But expression, then, nevertheless adopts a textual and generic form, that
specific form taken by philosophy. The genre of philosophy is to be strictly dif-
ferentiated from stories and histories (historiae); in the Theological-Political
Treatise, the works of the prophets and the fabulists (i.e., Ariosto’s Orlando
Furioso) are products of the imagination, are therefore signs requiring inter-
pretation and contextualisation. Knowledge of imaginative texts, from fables
to sacred texts (the Bible), has to be reconstructed from the history, language,
customs of its people and the personalities of its authors. The epistemic value
of imaginative textual forms such as those found in the Bible is to be unlocked
by immanent reading technologies that do not abstract textual meaning from
historical context: ‘all knowledge of Scripture must be sought only from Scrip-
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ture itself’, but ‘Scripture itself’ includes its history, the proximate chain of
causes that condition its production as an individuated work.13
However, as is evident from Spinoza’s own Ethics, not all textual artefacts
fall into this generic category. Philosophical textuality (the Ethics) and reli-
gious textuality (Scripture) are so epistemically different that the notion of
‘text’ cannot function as an overarching generic operator, as a concept that
would equally apply to both textual artefacts. One is left with the strik-
ing conclusion that certain symbolic products function as non-imaginative
sources of knowledge; they manifest textual forms that can be read as signs
but can also be read without reference to their specific sign character, and
thus subject to a non-hermeneutic process of intellection. Spinoza provides
an example of such a non-hermeneutic symbolic form, a medium for ‘common
notions’ that bypasses imaginative operations: Euclid’s Elements (Stoichea).
He describes this type of writing as follows:
Euclid wrote only about things quite simple and most intelligible.
Anyone can easily explain his work in any language. To grasp
his intention and be certain of his true meaning we don’t need
a complete knowledge of the language he wrote in, but only a
quite ordinary – almost childish! – knowledge. Nor do we need to
know about his life, concerns and customs, or in what language,
to whom and when he wrote, or the fate of his book, or its various
readings, or how and by whose deliberation it was accepted.14
Texts that communicate ‘common notions’ (geometrical knowledge belongs to
such common notions) demand self-consciously non-contextual reading tech-
nologies. Spinoza’s Ethics – even though it is notoriously not straightforward
or childish – would also presumably represent such a text, one that would ide-
ally not require any form of philological-contextual reconstruction in order to
grasp its veridical status. The textual form of the Ethics, its more geometrico,
is that precise form designed to demonstrate the adequation of its conclusions
as belonging to ‘common notions’. The result is that the exegetical tradition
surrounding the Ethics – when subjecting Spinoza’s text itself to contextu-
alisation, disambiguation, attentiveness to philological or historical detail –
implicitly approaches the text as a work of the imagination rather than the
intellect. Strictly speaking, then, there can be no faithful interpretation of
Spinoza’s Ethics, as interpretation would signal an infidelity to the epistemic
status claimed by the text itself, a testimony to its irreducible sign-character.
In this betrayal, however, there lies a higher-order fidelity, namely, to the
power of the book itself as an individuated entity that seeks to persevere in
its being, as endowed with a conatus. To the extent that one can read the
text genetically and interpretively – semiotically – one treats the book as an
image capable of flourishing. Spinoza’s book is a special book; it perseveres in
its being (its conatus) and flourishes according to its own individual essence
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inasmuch as it desires the flourishing of all things. Spinoza writes, ‘The more
an image is joined with other images, the more often it flourishes’ (E5P13).
The book provides an intellectual blueprint for the conjoining of images by
leading readers to an intellection of the idea of nature. The idea of nature
expresses this maximal binding of images, an absolute flourishing: ‘The Mind
can bring it about that all the Body’s affections, or images of things, are
related to the idea of God’ (E5P14). The textual form of reason – the gener-
ation of knowledge through ‘common notions’, if the Ethics is emblematic of
this operation – thus harbours an absolute imaginative imperative. Because
of its deduction of the power of the intellect as that which binds all images
– and an ontology in which perfection is equated with this maximal power
of binding – there has perhaps been no more ambitious textual dedication
to the infinite flourishing of images than the one produced by the ‘common
notions’ of the Ethics.
IV. THE REDEMPTION OF THE AESTHETIC
There remains another dimension of the aesthetic to explore in the speculative
reconstruction of Spinoza’s aesthetics. Spinoza’s ontology and epistemology
culminate in an ethical askesis, in the production of a human type: the
philosopher who knows nature and loves God in as adequate a manner as is
possible given human finitude. To what extent is art as a socially productive
practice compatible with the character of the wise person who embodies the
ideals associated with philosophical truth? What happens when the philoso-
pher becomes an artist?
As Moira Gatens notes, the closest figure to the artist in Spinoza’s works
is that of the prophet. The prophet communicates in stories, is endowed with
a vivid imagination, and is capable of generating, in the best of cases, true
moral insight – or in the worst of cases, blind obedience and corruption –
through these stories.15 The prophet, however, whose domain is faith and
revelation, is not a philosopher, whose domain is truth. In the Theological-
Political Treatise, Spinoza argues for an irreducible gap between philosophy
and faith: ‘the foundations of Philosophy are common notions, and [its truth]
must be sought only from nature. But the foundations of Faith are histories
and language, and [those foundations] must be sought only from Scripture
and revelation’.16 While philosophy and theology as discursive forms are thus
rigidly differentiated and seemingly mutually exclusive, each posit distinctive
representatives who embody their ideal types as respective generators of ex-
pressive and semiotic forms: the philosopher and the prophet. Each has their
domain of effective power, but the two shall never coincide.
Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise nevertheless entertains the possi-
bility of an individual who unites philosophical ideals and aesthetic prac-
tices, a figure who connects intuition (scientia intuitiva) with the produc-
tion of signs as obscure imaginative forms demanding interpretation: Christ,
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who taught ‘revelations. . . obscurely, and quite frequently through parables’.17
Spinoza’s Christ is a philosophical thought experiment, at one and the same
time an ideal of truth and a problematic exceptional figure. It is difficult, for
example, to reconcile Spinoza’s claim that Christ had a direct, mind-to-mind
access to moral truths of reason – which ‘were revealed [to him] immedi-
ately – without words or visions’ – with the rigorous naturalism of Spinoza’s
thought. Unlike other human beings, Christ represents an ideal of knowledge
that does not seem to have emerged from the imagination.18 Spinoza’s Christ
is nonetheless intended to be fully immanent in and of nature: Spinoza be-
lieves he was human, was never resurrected, and never performed miracles
that would contravene the necessary natural order.
Spinoza’s Christ nevertheless appears to embody a highly improbable
epistemological ideal.19 Rather than regard the idealisation of Christ as a
form of strategic outreach to radical Christian communities potentially more
amenable to Spinoza’s heterodox ideas,20 Spinoza’s Christ is perhaps better
grasped as a significant philosophical thought experiment: the positing of
a philosophical type who simultaneously embodies adequate truth (the uni-
versal validity of basic moral insights compatible with reason), the aesthetic
(obscure imaginative production), and a form of political and cultural power
transcending state sovereignty (Christ ‘was sent, not to preserve the state and
institute laws, but to teach the one universal law’).21
While the doctrines of the philosopher-teacher (Christ) can have the effect
of preserving the state and its laws, the legitimacy of these doctrines bypasses
the power of the state and acts of legislation. However, it is not just that the
validity of Christ’s moral insights is extra-legal. More radically, the manner
in which Christ’s universal moral maxims (loving one’s neighbour and God,
for example) enter the horizon of cultural validity – through congregations of
private individuals – happens to coincide with a suspension of state power; the
apostles preach their religion by virtue of the power of Christ ‘against the will
of those who had sovereignty’.22 Christ thus models a form of political power,
namely, a practice of reason and religion external to sovereignty (outside the
state’s laws and norms), as a reserve of insight that can feed back into political
formations via obscure forms of speech.
As a thought experiment, Christ thus conjoins philosophical, aesthetic,
and political operations. This thought experiment provides the most signifi-
cant source in Spinoza’s philosophy for a genesis of the aesthetic, namely, in
the emergence of obscure symbolic forms from absolutely rational understand-
ing. While Christ represents an epistemological and an ethical ideal, he thus
simultaneously gestures at the possibility of an aesthetic ideal: a philosopher-
poet of reason who seeks the proper imaginative (discursive) form in which
to convey extra-imaginative (non-discursive) truth. It is this precise problem
that occupies German poets and philosophers around 1800; indeed, Spinoza’s
Christ models a signifying practice for what could be called a mythology of
reason in the words of the Oldest System Program of Hegel, Hölderlin and
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Schelling. According to Spinoza’s account, Christ’s knowledge emerges with-
out medium, neither through imagination nor through common notions, as
a form of knowledge stemming from direct intuition rather than discursive
form; as one who transmits this knowledge, however, he becomes medium.
Christ thus still functions for Spinoza as a mediator of the divine (God or
nature), in the human form of a knowledge that transcends the human: ‘And
in this sense we can also say that God’s Wisdom, that is, a Wisdom surpass-
ing human wisdom, assumed a human nature in Christ, and that Christ was
the way to salvation.’23 This embodied wisdom, indeed, the idea of salvation
itself, contains as a necessary moment the externalisation of knowledge into
forms that can best be absorbed by the multitude.
Seen from this vantage point, Christ, as philosophical thought experiment,
represents an ideal that inverts the genetic sequence of philosophical knowl-
edge in Spinoza’s Ethics. Where the epistemic thrust of Spinoza’s Ethics
moves from the imagination to reason and finally to intuition, Christ mod-
els the inverse movement, namely from intuition back into products of the
imagination.
While Christ thus represents a distinctive form of imaginative practice
that could be considered aesthetic – insofar as it manifests itself in narrative
form, in the form of parables – this practice distinguishes itself from the
aesthetics of prophecy in important ways. First, Christ is not a prophet, but
a philosopher: ‘Christ was not so much a prophet as the Mouth of God’.24
Being the ‘Mouth of God’ entails speaking immanently in nature on behalf of
nature. Unlike the prophets, Christ ‘perceived things truly and adequately’.25
Second, as mentioned previously, the source of Christ’s knowledge does not
pass through the imagination: ‘if Moses spoke with God face to face, as a man
usually does with a companion (i.e., by means of their two bodies), Christ,
indeed, communicated with God mind to mind’.26 Mind to mind knowledge
of God – which is another way of saying adequate knowledge, as the ‘mind’
of God expresses adequate ideas of nature – alludes to Spinoza’s third kind
of knowledge, scientia intuitiva, inasmuch as it bypasses images and signs.27
Third, although Christ embodies an ideal of knowledge located purely in
the mind, this intuitive knowledge manifests itself in embodied agency; the
embodiment of intuitive knowledge follows from Spinoza’s notion that the
mind is an ‘idea of the body’ (what philosophers call Spinoza’s parallelism,
E2P13). When the mind thinks, something happens in the body that parallels
this thought. Fourth, the embodied action operating in parallel with intuitive
knowledge expresses itself in imaginative-aesthetic practices commensurate
with political agency: in the demonstration of ethical knowledge autonomous
from the state and conveyed in an aesthetic form (the parable) fitting the
constitution of the multitude and at the same time respecting the autonomy
of the multitude.
The possibility of a philosophical aesthetics in the Theological-Political
Treatise – an aesthetic productivity that results from a properly philosophical
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form of cognition – is thus entangled with problems of cultural and political
power. Christ, and by extension, the particular form of imaginative produc-
tivity he signifies, exhibits a tense relation to sovereign power, or the state
qua sovereign: Christ’s doctrines must simultaneously be commensurate with
a form of obedience to the state (proclaiming the overriding right of sovereign
authority with respect to its power); signal an independent form of discourse
outside the state (autonomous with respect to the state by virtue of Christ’s
own power); and performatively enact a transgressive form of action oper-
ating in contravention of the state (against the state by virtue of a form of
collective organisation drawing upon Christ’s power).
At the first level, that of obedience, Spinoza writes: ‘we are bound by
God’s command to cherish everyone, without exception, in accordance with
piety’,28 and following this decree, ‘no one can practice piety rightly, nor obey
God, unless he obeys all the decrees of the supreme ‘power’.29 Christ, insofar
as he is the ‘Mouth of God’, must teach a form of piety in accordance with
obedience to sovereign power.
At the second level, that of autonomy, however, Christ practices a form
of speech that transcends the institutions of a particular state, teaching the
validity of doctrines external to relations of sovereignty: Christ ‘did not insti-
tute laws as a lawgiver; instead as a teacher he taught lessons, because. . . he
did not want to correct external actions so much as the heart’.30 The parables
of Christ represent a signifying form through which this emendation of the
heart (a transformation of the subject) can be effected – a transformation that
does not conflict with the state, but operates relatively autonomously from
the state by articulating truths irreducible to the particularity of a nation, a
polity, or specific cultural norms.
At the third level, that of disobedience or resistance, Spinoza notes that
the followers of Christ taught religion as ‘private men who were accustomed
for a long time – against the will of those who had sovereignty and whose
subjects they were – . . . to manage everything by themselves, and to make
decrees without any concern of the sovereign’.31 The legitimacy of this con-
travention of state power is grounded ‘by right of the ‘power [potestas] they’d
received from Christ over impure spirits (see Matthew 10.1)’.32 Christ’s power
of action justifies disobedience in this particular instance, thereby seeming to
directly contradict Spinoza’s demand that everyone acting in accordance with
reason is bound to obey sovereign power. However, Spinoza conveys Christ’s
suspension of sovereign power as an exception, the implications of which he
immediately seeks to mitigate:
I explicitly warned that everyone is bound to keep faith even with
a Tyrant, except someone to whom God, by a certain revelation,
had promised special aid against the Tyrant. So no one is allowed
to take this as an example, unless he also has the ‘power [potestas]
to perform miracles.33
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Spinoza, as is well known, denies the possibility of supernatural miracles as
violations of the necessary order of nature. When he draws attention to the
suspension of sovereign power as something justified by ‘the power to perform
miracles’, this conception of a miracle must indicate an action revelatory of
the necessary order of nature rather than an exception to the order of nature.
The miracle of Christ in this instance could refer to ‘the separate revelation’
of intuitive knowledge itself – the source from which all his doctrines and
actions flow. Spinoza, against the explicit directives of his own thought, as-
signs a revolutionary function to Christ’s specific manifestation of intuitive
knowledge. In so doing, he simultaneously politicises the aesthetic potential
of the obscure speech of the Christian parable, which coheres variously with
different paradigms of political agency: art as obedience to sovereign power;
as autonomy from sovereign power; and as disruption of sovereign power.
The thought experiment exemplified by Christ not only makes aesthetic pro-
ductivity flow from intuitive knowledge, but makes this form of aesthetic
production oscillate among different attitudes to political power.
Two different forms of political agency manifest themselves in Christ’s ob-
scure speech, or aesthetic action flowing from intuition. First, the aesthetic
can take a stand against sovereign power by virtue of the power of its own
intellection. Second, the aesthetic can express itself in forms irreducible to
relations of domination. To be sure, Christ’s expression of philosophical truth
manifests itself not only in parables, but in doctrines (‘ a man who strikes
you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also [Matthew 5:39ff.]’).34 Such
pronouncements take the form of injunctions, and thereby seem to exercise
dominion. However, Spinoza claims that these utterances are not real com-
mands or injunctions, but the words of a teacher, words seeking to correct
the heart and the mind. The decree resembling that of a law emerges from a
strategic concern, namely, to speak ‘to oppressed men, who were living in a
corrupt republic, where justice was completely neglected’.35 Christ’s parables
are political acts of liberation that attend to their strategic rhetorical forms
in the attempt to bypass dominion through their power of affirmation; only in
seeming injunctions or in obscure forms of speech can truth be communicated
to those whose mentality has been deformed by the corruption of their re-
publics, to those exhibiting a diminished power of action (passivity) stemming
from a prior indoctrination. The form taken by speech proclaiming truth –
aesthetic form, in this instance, via the obscurity of the parable – appears as
the appropriate response to the diminished power of the multitude:
Christ, therefore, perceived the things revealed truly and ade-
quately. If he ever prescribed them as laws, he did this because
of the people’s ignorance and stubbornness. So in this respect he
acted in place of God, because he accommodated himself to the
mentality of the people. That’s why, although he spoke somewhat
more clearly than the other Prophets, he still taught these revela-
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tions obscurely, and quite frequently through parables, especially
when he was speaking to those to whom it was not yet given to
understand the kingdom of heaven (see Matthew 13:10 etc.). But
doubtless when he was speaking to those to whom it was given
to know the mysteries of the heavens, he taught things as eternal
truths and did not prescribe them as laws. In this way he freed
them from bondage to the law. Nevertheless, he [didn’t abolish
the law for them, but] confirmed and established it more firmly,
and wrote it thoroughly in their hearts.36
The imaginative or signifying form taken by scientia intuitiva (knowing things
‘truly and adequately’) is channeled into a mode of communication that best
activates the community of the oppressed. Aesthetic form flowing from the
truth of intuition thus exhibits three tendencies: it provides a mediation of
moral truths informed by adequate knowledge that is otherwise inaccessible to
the multitude, and is thus politically conditioned, strategic speech (sign rather
than expression); it nevertheless seeks to activate the heart and the mind
rather than declaring laws and injunctions, and thus seeks to bypass forms of
dominion associated with sovereign power; and finally, it has a destabilising
effect on all other mythologising forms, namely those based on convention,
ceremony, or authority.
The aim of obscure speech flowing from adequate knowledge and of philo-
sophical discourse has the same goal, a goal that Spinoza attributes to Christ:
to ‘free all equally from bondage to the law, so that they would no longer act
well because of the Law’s commandment, but because of a constant decision
of the heart’.37 This constant ‘decision of the heart’ is nothing other than
the higher-order bondage to the laws of nature. The model of aesthetic truth
coming to light here culminates in an un-conditioning of the multitude from
the law of convention and authority in order to bind them to the law of that
which is itself unconditioned and without limit. As the necessity of nature
itself is free, autonomous, self-determined and self-determining, the bondage
of the mind (the heart) to nature generated in philosophical discourse and in
the imaginative works of Christ represents an absolute emancipatory ideal.
CONCLUSION
This particular genesis of the aesthetic – the aesthetic as a form of obscurity
itself produced by and required by rationality, as light that must beget its own
form of darkness in order to increase its luminosity – unites Spinoza’s affir-
mative philosophy of individuation with a critical potential. While Spinoza’s
philosophy suggests multiple possible directions for a speculative aesthetics,
many of which have been explored in this paper, one of the most significant
achievements of a speculative reconstruction of Spinoza’s aesthetics consists
in uniting an infinitely affirmative and generative appreciation for individ-
uated forms with a sense of emancipatory urgency for those living in times
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of darkness. The thought experiment of the emancipatory philosopher-poet
(Christ) explores a paradigm of affirmative aesthetic productivity invested
with an ethical and a political task: to make salvation – living in accordance
with epistemically adequate ideals of wisdom that maximise joy and one’s
power of action – available to all. There is no prescribed aesthetic form that
would correspond to this task, neither the epic, nor the tragedy, nor the novel,
as the criterion for such aesthetic form would not be dictated in advance, but
emergent according to the transformative capacity that such aesthetic forms
might effect within a population.
The crux of this aesthetic philosophy lies in the ascetic dimensions of a
veridical aesthetics, i.e., in the capacity of imaginative works, common no-
tions, or embodiments of intuition to function as exercises in accessing and
activating truth, whether in the obscure parables of Christ or in the geomet-
rical style of the Ethics. While Spinoza differentiates himself from Christ in
the degree of adequation of his knowledge – Spinoza notes, at the end of the
Treatise, that he is human and thus can err – the philosopher, like Christ,
still undertakes a quest for the expressive and imaginative forms through
which the infinity of the totality of nature can enter into the fabric of the
social world and thereby reconfigure the relation of subjects to one another.
If the task of the philosopher is to see the world ‘under the aspect of eter-
nity’, this very view can re-enter the temporal world – flowing from eternity
back into duration – through the cultivation of a veridical aesthetics. Such
a re-entry into the world would orient itself around ideals of emancipation
simultaneously intellectual and political, and it is here that the particularity
of Spinoza’s aesthetics is to be found: a critical aesthetics in the service of
a politics of joy, devoid of resentment and hatred, open to all. If there is a
genesis of the aesthetic in Spinoza’s philosophical writings, such is the picture
of the world that it would seek to bring into being.
gtrop@email.unc.edu
NOTES
1See Gatens 2015; Gatens and
Uhlmann 2020; Montag 2020; Sparrow
2010; Sparrow 2011; and Romagni 2021.
2Parenthetical citations of Spinoza’s
Ethics will refer as necessary to parts, pos-
tulates, definitions, appendices, and scho-
lia in Curley’s edition of Spinoza’s Col-
lected Works (Spinoza 1985).
3Spinoza describes the different kinds




7See Sparrow 2010 and 2011.
8James 2010, 267.
9Romagni 2021, 471. Special thanks to
Jason Yonover for drawing my attention to
Romagni’s contribution.
10See Tóth 2017, who argues that the
second kind of knowledge extends to di-
etetics (and by extension to physiological
aesthetics) and facilitates the capacity to












19For some of the problems that plague
Spinoza’s picture of Christ – some of which
result from problems concerning Spinoza’s
epistemology in general (i.e. is it possible
for finite minds to acquire adequate ideas
if this knowledge is generated by some-
thing external to it?), and some of which
are specific to Christ of the TTP (why
does Spinoza believe the Bible’s claim that
Christ communicates with God mind-to-
mind?), see Della Rocca 2008, 246-491.







27See James 2012, 109.
28Spinoza 2016, 337.
29Spinoza 2016, 337. Supreme ‘power
refers to a form of power conferring legiti-
macy via institutions, potestas rather than
potentia. (‘power with the apostrophe pre-
ceding it is used to indicate potestas rather
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